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Abstract 
 
The Singapore-Johor-Riau (SIJORI) Growth Triangle 
established in the late 1980s is the first regional cooperation 
framework in Southeast Asia. However, such a promising 
framework ran into a dilemma after ten years of development. 
Main factors accounting for its unanticipated limited progress 
include uneven regional economic performance, divergent 
individual interests at all levels, rising social problems, and 
uncertain external environment. A thorough review of the 
growth triangle with special attention on the progress as well as the issues be inspiring for the 
further promotion of the regional cooperation, which requires dynamics both internal and external. 
The first category of dynamics includes the design of a unified administrative institution, 
coordination between public and private sectors, more liberal policies, the proper understanding of 
social and knowledgeable elements, the role of overseas Chinese and the utilization of historical 
legacies. The other category mainly underlines utilizing external stimuli outside the region, 
especially China’s Maritime Silk Road Initiative (MSRI). 
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Introduction 
 
Southeast Asia in the post-WWII period has been considered a place with changing dynamics, such 
as strengthened foreign relations, reduced intra-regional tensions and enhanced domestic security. 
Although there remain local insurgencies, political disagreements and, ideological divergences, much 
progress in regional economic cooperation, and integration have been made by Southeast Asian 
nations (Leung 2012). The achievement was further encouraged and formalized during the Bali 
Summit in 1976, when official cooperation within ASEAN countries was declared. Within this 
context, the then deputy prime minister of Singapore, Goh Chok Tong, announced the 
establishment of Singapore-Johor-Riau Islands Growth Triangle (i. e. SIJORI-GT) in 1989, aiming 
at promoting more economic cooperation between the three neighbouring regions. 
Within the SIJORI-GT, theoretical rationales for this regional cooperation have been searched 
by both officials and scholars. At heart lay an expectation of improved redistribution and exchange 
of regional comparative advantage, such as massive flows of foreign investment, geographical 
proximity, labour, capital, technology, etc. (Thant 1998; Lee 1991). On the one hand, Singapore, 
as the most significant trade and financial centre in Southeast Asia, was then endowed with 
considerable capital, skilled labour, high technology, easy access to world markets, and advanced 
infrastructure. By contrast, the lack of these advantages was a check on economic development in 
Johor and the Riau Islands. On the other hand, Singapore is a very tiny island without natural 
resources, sufficient land and unskilled labour, which, however, were abundant but rarely utilized in 
adjacent Johor and the Riau Islands. Such complementary differences were expected to help expand 
the tripartite cooperation on the basis of the relocation of industries, creation of new logistic chains, 
and optimization of the economic structure. The expected outcome would not only stimulate 
regional integration but also improve the capacity of the unity as a whole in resisting external risks 
from international market. Therefore, this arrangement attracted significant interest from other 
regions immediately after its establishment; thus, when more Malaysian and Indonesian states 
joined the partnership, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed on 17 December 
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1994 by the representatives of the participating countries to expand SIJORI-GT into a new 
grouping, namely the Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapore Growth Triangle (IMS-GT). It has been hailed 
as a major step in sub-regional cooperation, and was regarded as a model for further economic 
cooperation in ASEAN (Lee 1991). Encouraged by the initial progress, several new cooperative 
frameworks were also promoted, such as IMT-GT, BIMP-EAGA, GMS-GT involving Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand and other countries along the Mekong River. 
Widely discussed debates have been generated over the establishment of this cooperation 
framework. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, scholars including M. Thant (1998), Lee Tsao Yuan 
(1991), Chou (2010), and Thambipillai (1991) have intensively investigated the influence of 
transnational economic cooperation, the factors accounting the development of SIJORI-GT as well 
as the challenges it encountered. However, such an ideal initiative ran into a dilemma when the 
Asian Crisis broke out in 1997. The fluctuations in international market exerted negative impact on 
the regional flows of capital and technology. The tripartite economic cooperation hence fall into 
stagnation. It was further deteriorated by the global financial crisis starting from 2008. As a result, 
neither SIJORI-GT nor IMS-GT gained much attention after entering the twentieth-first century. 
Nevertheless, there are still scholars, such as Tan (2014), Peng (2002/2003), Das et al. (2013), 
Sparke et al. (2004), trying to emphasize its significance and draw lessons for promoting other 
cooperation frameworks presently. 
It is evident that, on the one hand, scholars have positively assessed the achievement of 
SIJORI-GT, but one the other hand, they have also pointed out that the progress still leaves much 
to be desired. Three decades have passed after its establishment, and it is instead time to make a 
reassessment of the past experience. This article hence tries to do a thorough review of the SIJORI-
GT, summarize its progress as well as the problems. In order to provide advice on how to resolve the 
problems that restrict the tripartite cooperation, this article presents a more efficient utilization of 
both internal and external dynamics, especially by taking advantage of China’s new Maritime Silk 
Road Initiative (MSRI). 
 
Regional Progress in Retrospect 
 
The SJORI-GT drew significantly on mutual complementarities of the three economies involved. 
The three economies were at different stages of development. Such a condition helped them to gain 
benefits from closer cooperation by enabling them to make the best use of their comparative and 
competitive advantage. The growth zone allowed the stakeholders to combine individual 
competitive strengths to make the sub-region an attractive destination for regional and international 
investors. Following great endeavour by the three governments in the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
significant progress could be perceived in many aspects. 
 
Resource Redistribution, Industrial Relocation, and Infrastructure Reconstruction 
The immediate benefits brought by the establishment of SIJORI-GT to Singapore were the supply 
of fresh water, natural resources such as food and natural gas. The water supply was of the most 
significant importance to Singapore. Although as early as in 1961 and 1962 Singapore signed 
agreements with Malaysia to give Singapore rights of drawing up water from Johor, more 
considerable work was done after the establishment of the SIJORI-GT. The planned Linggiu 
Reservoir was finally completed in the 1990s as agreed by the supplementary agreement between the 
two governments in 1990 by building a dam across the Johor River. Together with Johor River 
Water Works (JRWW), Singapore was able to draw raw water from the reservoir and channelled the 
water to the three water treatment plants (Jackson and Hangzo 2016). Moreover, in 1990, 
Singapore and Indonesia signed an agreement to cooperate in the development of the Riau 
Province. The 1990 agreement includes provisions covering a wide range of cooperation, among 
which is to assist in water supply, transportation infrastructure development, and maintenance 
(Wong and Ng 2009). 
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Meanwhile, advanced infrastructure, financial resources and management expertise flowed 
adversely from Singapore to Johor and the Riau Islands. The advent of the funds from Singapore 
had profound impact on local economic development of Johor and the Riau Islands, which initiated 
various reforming schemes and preferential policies to accommodate and utilize these resources. As a 
result, many labour and land intensive industries as well as other non-manufacturing enterprises of 
Singapore relocated their plants in the neighbouring areas, especially in the industrial parks and free 
trade areas which were jointly developed by property developers from Singapore in order to take 
advantage particularly of the cheap labour wages (Wong and Ng 2009). 
Infrastructure in Johor and the Riau Islands was hence improved for the relocated industries, 
particularly the establishment of industrial parks and improvement of port and airport facilities. In 
Johor in 1994, 16 industrial estates were operating, and a further 12 were planned. Among them, 
Pasir Gudang, which was next to Johor port and located very close to Singapore, was the largest and 
most successful industrial estate and free-trade zone in Johor (Wadley and Prasati 2000). In 
addition to the relocation of small firms engaging in rubber processing, garments, textiles, and 
electronics, Singapore also spread information resources to Johor. Five stations of Singapore Media 
Corp covered the main area of Johor Bahru (Ho and So 1997). 
The progress was more significant to the south of the strait. Long before the establishment of 
growth triangle, the Indonesian government has been keen in establishing a regional centre of 
industry, logistics, and tourism to alleviate the problem of regional overdependence on oil and gas 
in Riau. In Batam, facilitated by the Batam Industrial Development Authority (BIDA) formed in 
1973, the island became a duty-free zone and was intended to be a high-technology centre. In 1992, 
the US$200 million Batam Industrial Park (Batamindo) was opened; it was developed jointly by 
Singapore and Indonesian public and private sectors, including Singapore Technologies Industrial 
Cooperation, Jurong Environment Engineering and major Indonesian business conglomerates 
including the Salim Group and Bimantara (Thambipillaia 1991). Considerable electronics industry 
investment together with pharmaceutical, plastics, and light industries, were attracted to Batam 
(East Asia Analytical Unit 1973). Port facilities were also upgraded with the investment from 
Batamindo to build a regional transit port. Such improvement of infrastructure was indicated by the 
reconstruction of Hang Nadim International Airport, road network and water supply facilities on 
the island (Wong and Ng 2009). 
The improvement was witnessed on Bintan Islands as well, where plantations produced palm 
oil, coconut. Moreover, the Bintan Industrial Estate was developed on the west of the island and the 
Bintan Beach International Resort (BBIR) was developed on the north coast. Up to 1998, a total of 
29 international companies set up their branches in Bintan, including Khong Guan, Sumitomo 
Metal, Foster, etc. Same agribusiness, light industries and shipping services were also established on 
other islands, such as Bulan, Singkep, and Karimun (East Asia Analytical Unit 1973). 
 
Capital and Labour Flows 
The construction of industrial parks and transfer of manufacturers led to a considerable increase of 
FDI and migration for investment and tourism. In Johor, the local economy benefited greatly from 
the close ties with Singapore. For the 1981 to 1990 period, the share of Singaporean investments in 
Johor accounted for 22.7 percent of approved investments (Ho and So 1997). When coming to the 
late 1990s, more than 47 percent of Singapore’s investment in Malaysia was directed to Johor 
represented by 104 projects and RM170 million. Investment took place in a wide range of 
industries including petrochemicals, chemicals, steel mills, electrical and electronics, textiles, rubber 
and processed food. To attract FDI, the Johor government took adequate measures to encourage the 
development of industrial estates in particular.  
The Riau Islands also rapidly became a major destination of Singapore’s FDI. In 1996, more 
than 20 percent of Singapore investment in Indonesia was directed to the Riau Islands. Singapore 
was the largest foreign investor in Batam, accounting for around 48 per cent of total investment. In 
the adjacent Bintan Island, in 1991, Singaporean captal investment was seen in the following fields: 
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tourism (25.6 per cent), real estate (25.7 per cent), steel and iron (15.1 per cent), oil mining 
equipment (13.1 per cent) and electronics (10.2 per cent) (Ho and So 1997). 
Accompanied by caption flows, the number of labour migration and cross-border tourists 
increased simultaneously. In the 1990s, more than 70 percent of the tourists entering Malaysia came 
from Singapore, and their annual expense in Johor exceeded 0.4 billion us dollars. Each day more 
than 50,000 tourists and 18,000 vehicles entering Johor through Singapore. The Riau Islands also 
witnessed a net inflow of 1 million immigrants annual due to the establishment of industries (See 
www.bps.go.id). 
For Singapore, Johor provided Singapore with resources of leisure and tourism, as well as 
opportunities for investment and commerce. While cross-border movement also took place from 
Johor and the Riau Islands to Singapore, mainly in the form of the workforce, who moved easily to 
Singapore to sell their labour services. In the case of Johor, according to the regional statistics, only 
in 2000, an average of 30,000-50,000 workers travelled from Johor to Singapore per day. The 
position of Johor as an intermediate for Singapore was thus strengthened. 
Attributed to the effort made by the three states, the SIJORI-GT has played a crucial role in 
stimulating regional economic development since its establishment. It opened up new economic 
opportunities and allowed a considerable transfer of commodities, capital, technology, human 
resources and knowledge beyond and across national boundaries (Chou 2006). Such achievements 
led to consistent economic growth in the first decade of the present century. Johor and the Riau 
Islands picked up economic momentum with their following bilateral links with Singapore and 
became regional industrial centres and tourist destinations. This progress was indicated clearly in 
Table 1, which displays their accelerating growth rates of GDP. The economic growth of Johor and 
the Riau Islands were even higher than the national average, respectively (Wong and Ng 2009). 
 
Table 1. Basic Indicators for the IMS-GT, in 1994, 2003-2017 (selected years) 
 1994 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2017 
Singapore (S$ billi.) 
GDP (at current 
price) 
112.7 170 212.1 271.2 279.9 346.7 378.5 408.1 422.7 
Growth rate (2010 
constant price) 
10.9% 4.4% 7.5% 8.9% -0.1% 6.2% 5% 1.9% 3.6% 
Johor (RM billi.) 
GDP (at current 
price) 
16.6 46.1 50 59.8 62.5 80.3 91.4 106.7 119.8 
Growth rate (2005 
constant price) 9.6% 4.1% 4.2% 4.1% -3.0% 6.4% 4.7%
* 5.6%* 6.2%* 
% of total national 
GDP 
6.3 9.0 10.2 9.8 9.4 9.6 9.2 8.5 8.2 
The Riau Islands (IDR trilli.) 
GDP (at current 
price) 
143.2 32.8 40.9 51.8 63.9 80.2 100.3 124.9 133.8 
Growth rate (2000 
constant price) 12.1%
** - 6.6% 7.0% 3.5% 6.7% 6.1% 6.0%* 2.0%* 
% of total national 
GDP 
- 1.67 1.53 1.46 1.37 1.33 1.32 1.29 1.27 
Note: * at 2010 constant prices; **data of the Riau Province, 1993 
(The higher growth rate was mainly due to the exploitation of petroleum around Dumai on the mainland) 
Source: Department of Statistics Singapore (http://www.singstat.gov.sg/), Department of Statistics Malaysia 
(http://www.statistics.gov.my/), Statistics Indonesia (http://www.bps.go.id). 
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Unsolved Problems and Explanatory Factors 
 
The individual economic performance of the three regions is illustrated by some basic indicators 
shown in Table 1. However, such progress was made in the shadow of dissatisfaction which can be 
summarized from the same table. There are still problems unsolved, especially the expected 
economic boom did not take place in the triangle through expected metropolitan spillovers and 
coupling effect. 
 
Unsolved Problems 
Firstly, GDP growth was much slower in the first decade of the present century than in the 1990s 
and growth rates of the three regions kept declining after the announcement of SIJORI. Notably, 
the lowers growth rates of Johor and Riau Islands than that of Singapore indicated an enlarged gap 
between them. 
Secondly, the declining proportion of regional GDP of Johor and the Riau Islands in the total 
of Malaysia and Indonesia further affirmed the unsatisfactory economic performance, as their 
economic status did not get enhanced or was still marginalized. For instance, the core area of the 
triangle, the Riau Islands, remains one of the poorest provinces in Indonesia. 
Thirdly, the intended capital and advanced technology from Singapore flowed much more 
into tourism rather than that into manufacturing sectors. As a result, the upgrade of industry and 
optimisation of economic structure in Johor and the Riau Islands was delayed.  
Fourthly, the industrial transfer of Singapore did not help solve the problem of 
unemployment in Johor and the Riau Islands. In the latter, rates of regional unemployment were 
higher than the national average. Especially in the 1990s when SIJORI-GT was just initiated, such 
stimuli resulted in the rise of unemployment rate ironically.  
The last, the economic connections between the three regions were not intensified evenly. 
From a historical perspective, the economic connection between Singapore and Johor was much 
stronger than that between Singapore and the Riau Islands, while the connection between Johor and 
the Riau Islands was negligible. Such a patter remains unchanged from then up to the present day. 
Therefore, the three regions did not form a complete form of “triangle,” but an “hourglass” with 
Singapore as its neck. Within the once mighty unified empire in this area, the Johor-Riau Sultanate, 
there are still intensive social, cultural and religious relations between Johor and the Riau Islands, 
but their economic connections were not maintained. 
 
 
Figure 2. Unemployment rates of Riau Province, Riau Islands Provinces and Indonesia, 1986-2016 
Source: Unemployment Rate (UR) by Province, 1986-2016 
(https://www.bps.go.id/index.php/linkTabelStatis/981) 
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Therefore, the positive effect of the SIJORI was somewhat limited. Following Koch’s 
argument, we should view this region with cautious optimism from the economic perspective (Koch 
2000). In practice, the expected redistribution of regional comparative advantage was not realized, 
or the initial progress failed to extend its scale and level of cooperation (Chen 2009). Peng 
(2002/2003) has also argued that Singaporean business did not have the cultural resources to 
expand far beyond the growth triangle. Neither Malaysia nor Indonesia adopted effective policies to 
direct the capital in the triangle to other parts of their nations. After the mid-1990s, the SIJORI-GT 
reached its limit as labour costs and rent rose in Johor and the Riau Islands, and FDI became 
saturated. Thus, the growth triangle has not been able to generate a strong chain effect that results 
in extensive geo-economic changes in Southeast Asia.  
Moreover, many regional projects were carried out independently rather than cooperatively. 
In the Riau Islands, the BIDA was operated separately by utilizing domestic private capital. So was 
the Iskandar Malaysia, a project some three times the size of Singapore, in southern Johor, 
developed by the Malaysian government in 2006. Instead of cooperation, Iskandar Malaysia was 
designed to both compete with and integrate with the Singaporean economy (Rizzo 2012). Such 
independent endeavour rather than Singapore-dominated collaboration resulted in better economic 
growth as indicated by the indicators in 2010.  
 
Explanatory Factors 
In retrospect, it is hard to see the effect and benefit of mutual cooperation between the three 
regions, although scholarship and politicians have not widely admitted the unsatisfactory outcome 
of SIJORI (Grundy-Warr 1999). Reasons for the limited progress are various. 
The most important rationale for SIJORI-GT was the idea of redistributing regional 
comparative advantage, especially capital and technology from Singapore, while land and labour 
from the other two places. When considering conditions one and a half centuries ago, this idea was 
not new. Just as Hughes and Holland have argued that the core region supplied the periphery with 
higher-order services, while the periphery furnished the core with natural resource-based 
commodities in the colonial period of Singapore (Hughes and Holland 1994). Since the 1870s 
when agriculture and agricultural processing industries dominated regional economic structure, the 
advantage of Singapore was the regional concentration of using advanced technology and the high 
potential of well-qualified skilled workers. Nevertheless, Singapore had also been faced with 
problems of limited available land and large demand for unskilled or semi-skilled labour force 
(Stejskal and Hajek 2012). Unfortunately, these problems were never solved although there was 
moderate utilization of land and labour from Johor and the Riau Islands, technology and capital 
were still concentrated in Singapore. This pattern hence resulted in very weak backward linkages 
from Singapore to the periphery of Johor and the Riau Islands, as Huff and Angeles have argued 
that in the post-1870 Southeast Asia relatively few major flows of commodities were created (Huff 
and Angeles 2011). Coming into the late twentieth century, economic development and structure 
in the Riau Islands did not experience much improvement as compared with colonial times. Small 
markets and weak economic infrastructure meant that Johor and the Riau Islands were too small for 
advanced Singaporean elements, pushing Singapore to seek external markets for cooperation. 
Therefore, the spread effect of redistribution of regional comparative advantage was somewhat 
limited. 
Meanwhile, the was divergent political intentions among the region. Individual interests of 
governments involved were not convergent at all levels. Especially in Johor and the Riau Islands, the 
disadvantage of the limited scale of economy was further signified by different intentions of national 
and regional governments. Regarding the SIJORI-GT, commitment, and promotion from high-
level politicians played an essential role in its establishment. However, their purposes diverged 
significantly. Singaporean politicians preferred an easing and flexible policy environment, so that 
Singapore could intensify its regional connections with Johor and the Riau Islands by using their 
resources on the one hand and extended its international links to the world market on the other 
side. However, national development plans for Johor and the Riau Islands in Malaysia and 
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Indonesia were different from Singapore respectively. For these two countries, the highest priority 
was to maintain and protect national interest. Therefore, their starting point of policy making was 
to improve national competitiveness, and regional cooperation was only one of the measures for this 
purpose. As such, Johor and the Riau Islands might not fully participate in a formal cooperative 
organization or agreement unless the cooperation would not impede national interests. To some 
extent, general or complete regionalism or regional integration was not preferred by Malaysia and 
Indonesia. 
Moreover, Malaysia and Indonesia were not satisfied with its role in the SIJORI-GT only as a 
supportive partner for Singapore. The flows of natural resources and labour from Johor and the 
Riau Islands were realized without too much difficulty, but the expected transfer of technology and 
managerial expertise from Singapore could not be realized in the short run, because it depended 
greatly on the willingness of Singapore but without commitment. And in this framework, the 
dominant position of Singapore as the core of region was implicitly admitted, which undermined 
the status of Johor and the Riau Islands. High officials of Johor State mentioned that Johor should 
deserve an equal position as Singapore in the triangle (Rizzo and Glasson 2012). Also, the then prime 
minister of Malaysia, Muhyiddin Yasin expressed more than once publicly that Johor was not only 
the supplier of Singapore to provide natural resources, but was also eager to develop manufacture 
and tourism. In Indonesia, the government evaluated the agriculture and source intensive industry 
as “sensitive” or “strategic”. Restrictions were consequently set up to protect these two sectors. Also, 
in the Riau Islands, Batam was planned by the Indonesian government as “the Singapore of 
Indonesia” to direct trade and commerce of Singapore to Indonesia. Therefore, preferential policies 
were adopted as a consequence to accommodate foreign enterprises, but reality proved that such an 
intention was challenging to realize. Within this context, Singapore did not have full access to the 
abundant regional natural sources, and all sorts of barriers and obstacles inhibited the activities of 
Singaporean capital, leading to insufficient and inefficient regional cooperation. 
Even with one country, national and regional interests also contradicted with each other 
frequently. The SIJORI-GT was promoted from the top down, while the policy from central 
government met numerous obstacles during the implementation. Especially when interests of 
involved parts were not concurrent, problems concerning land rent, human right and social equality 
would emerge. For instance, as a state in the Malaysia, Johor enjoyed certain autonomy in the 
process of policy-making. In recent years, Malaysian government hoped to improve the 
infrastructure in Johor, especially to reconstruct airport and expressways to fulfil the expanding 
commerce. But meanwhile, central government had also to pay attention to the interests of other 
states, so that policies could not be particular in favour of Johor and conflicts between different 
states would also rise. In Indonesia, central government had also to take consideration of the 
development of non-frontier areas of cooperation and the periphery where the economic 
development was relatively lagged, therefore, in the Riau Islands, a group of projects of 
infrastructure construction was located in the inland area rather than along the ports near 
Singapore. The influence of these investments was thus limited. 
In addition, there were rising social problems brought by the SIJORI-GT. Mass public of the 
three different areas were concerned with the change of environment as influenced by the triangle. 
At the same time, people of different religions and ethnicities from the same area might also conflict 
with each other because of the change of their economic status. Local society in Johor was not clear 
about Singaporean economic intention in Johor, and also unsatisfied with the increasing expense on 
living because of the rising price index caused by the influx of Singaporean capital. Regional 
merchants thus called on the government to restrict the scale of economy and trade between Johor 
and Singapore (Rizzo and Glasson 2012). In the Riau Islands, local government worried about the 
negative impact if all investments were concentrated in the coastal area. As a result, divergence 
between core and periphery, and urban-rural would be enlarged, causing the problem of social 
inequality (Long 2011). 
The change in the external environment exerts a negative impact. Recently, both Singapore 
and the other two stakeholders have more options when conducting regional cooperation. SIJORI-
The SIJORI Growth Triangle: Progress, Problems and Prospect (Xu Xiaodong) 
 
 
8 
GT was not the sole candidate especially when faced with the gradually implementation of China’s 
Belt and Road Initiative and other cooperative frameworks. For Singapore, although Johor and the 
Riau Islands are geographically approximated, abundant labour forces and broad markets in India 
and Vietnam were also favoured by Singaporean capital. Also, in both Johor and the Riau Islands, 
Singaporean capital was not particularly favoured, while either domestic capital or capital from 
other countries, such as China, India, Vietnam, or Japan was encouraged. 
 
New Dynamics for Regional Economic Cooperation and Development 
 
Above discussion shows that complementary economic structures and geographic proximity brought 
in the possibility for cooperation, but more efficient and consistent trans-boundary cooperation 
requires more dynamics to eliminate conflicts of interest and to converge agreement. It is suggested 
that the precondition of sub-regional cooperation depends on the improvement of individual 
regional competitiveness which is guaranteed by two sorts of dynamics. One category focuses on 
internal elements including the design of a unified administrative institution, coordination between 
public and private sectors, more liberal policies, the proper understanding of social and 
knowledgeable factors and the utilization of historical legacies. The other category mainly 
underlines utilizing external stimuli outside the region, especially China’s MSRI. 
 
Internal Dynamics 
The constituent parts of the SIJORI-GT included three individual states: a city-state (Singapore), a 
state within a federal system (Johor) and a province under a unitary system (the Riau Islands). Its 
national leaders represented Singapore while its state leaders represented Johor and Riau was by its 
government leaders from Jakarta. Such unequal political status caused a group of problems such as 
the conflicts of interest, low efficiency of governmental administration, etc. Therefore, it is 
increasingly urgent to set up a new unified managerial institution to coordinate the three 
stakeholders when faced with divergent interest pursues to encourage more efficient cooperation. 
Consideration the fact that such an institution has to accommodate three political units of different 
hierarchies, the central governments of Malaysia and Indonesia probably have to give more local 
autonomy in the process of policy-making in the context of regional affairs for the sake of validity 
and authority of local policies. In this regard, the establishment of a special policy zone might be a 
possible solution. 
The critical role of public sectors represented by the government is to provide facility and 
safeguards by making policies to ensure positional relationship and cooperation. Therefore, either 
the central or local governments have to create the systems for the flow commodities and service 
freely in the area to bring more opportunities for commerce and investment. Necessary measures 
may include making regulations to free and encourage trade and investment, simplify labour 
movement and recruitment, reduce the restrictions of external exchange, as well as ensure 
sustainable development of resource and energy (Wadley and Parasati 2000). Limited government 
inference will thus indicate the largest extent of an open market and profitability to form a 
development pattern driven by market integration (Acharya 1995). The effect of this concept in 
promoting regional connections was testified in the period before the Great Depression when no 
customs tariff was involved, protectionism and interventionism was light and foreign investment 
were encouraged. These measures and attitudes facilitated the free flow of capital and people both 
locally and from outside. Therefore, in order to recover or re-promote such historical cooperation, it 
is better for the government to remove barriers between the regions which were placed in the 1950s 
and 1960s.  
Currently, the new regionalism is a direct result of the success of multilateral liberalisation 
whereby countries or regions trying to enter the multilateral system compete among themselves for 
the direct investment necessary for their successful participation in that system. By internalising an 
important externality, regionalism plays a key role in expanding and preserving the liberal trade 
order (Ethier 1998). A good sign was the negotiation of bilateral or multilateral free trade 
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agreements and the creation of domestic institutions since the 1990s at both national and regional 
levels. Nevertheless, more liberal preference is still needed at the sub-regional level, especially in the 
Riau Islands, where concerns still remain about the historically rooted smuggling, piracy, and 
trafficking. Historical experience shows that harsh policies did not manage to eliminate these 
problems. Thus, the implication of non-state involvement in the regulation should be promoted 
and favoured to enhance interdependence rather than individual independence (Ford and Lyons 
2013). 
As discussed above, economic complementariness, to some extent, also reflects the gap and 
divergence between different partners. Lower economic development or more mediocre growth 
potential will thus result in a weaker position of a lagging area in the cooperation, undermining the 
stability of the cooperative framework. It is hence particularly crucial for Johor and the Riau Islands 
to take significant consideration of advanced and endogenous knowledgeable and social factors, 
such as practical managerial expertise, advanced technology, and innovative concepts, etc. 
Moreover, the structural difference in society and social problems resulting from unbalanced 
economic development have also to be carefully handled.  Although since 1995 the Riau Islands has 
been characterized by increasing population mobility, the influx of population was as a result of 
inter-provincial migrants rather than foreign migrants (Suryadinata 2008). Thus, it would be 
regrettable if these non-Malay ethnic groups could not receive stimuli from the government since 
the economy today is focusing on the communication of social capital (Stejskal and Hajek 2012). 
Moreover, evidence shows that there has been growing Japanese importance in the triangle area 
since the nineteenth century. Regional economic cooperation should not only rely on Singapore; 
instead, the Japanese seem to offer a third alternative. A pattern of harmonious multi-ethnic 
diversity can thus contribute not only to political balance, but also to social stability and mobility, 
and economic diversity (Sasse 2010). Therefore, respecting and coordinating with social 
discrepancies are the precondition for eliminating the social suspicion resulting from different 
political and economic intentions within the triangle.  
 
The Role of Regional Overseas Chinese 
Phelps (2005) has argued that closely intertwined regional colonial histories have ensured the 
importance of traditional concerns. Secure internal connections had already been there since the 
foundation of Singapore in 1819. The development of port facilities and the establishment of both 
Chinese and Western business firms and shipping companies endowed Singapore with initial 
advantage to attract trade, people and capital from adjacent regions. The economics of proximity, 
complementarity and a shared history drove participation between neighbours (Ho and So 1997). 
The advantage brought by them was consolidated by the arrival of steamers and the establishment 
of industry, banks, and insurance companies during high colonialism. Progress was mainly achieved 
with the help of the Europeans and the Chinese. However, their role was restricted in the post-war 
Johor and Riau Islands, where Malays gained more preference. Although we cannot deny the 
economic importance of Malays, compared to the Europeans and Chinese, their mobility and 
economic abilities were limited. Thus, when the Europeans and Chinese were not supported or even 
restricted to the post-colonial Johor and Riau Islands, the regional connections were also 
undermined. Olzak (1998) has suggested that both political and economic integration into the 
world system is influentially related to ethnic politics both in the periphery and core. It is hence 
suggested that the re-establishment of regional connections lies in the recovery of European and 
Chinese economic and social initiatives as a continuation of the colonial pattern. Some effort in this 
direction has been made, but not enough. 
 
The Utilization of Historical Connections 
The current borders and interstate relations between Singapore, Johor and the Riau Islands were 
created and maintained by colonization. Thus, the role of political administration plays an essential 
role as illustrated by the analysis of competitive advantage. A high degree of collaboration is 
associated with a unified government (in colonial Malaya), harmonious diplomatic relationships 
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(Anglo-Dutch relationship in the period of high colonialism) and effective administration 
(Singapore, Johor after 1911, and the Riau Islands during high colonialism). The integration of 
labour, commerce, finance, and investment is an outcome of the easing of political tensions and the 
formation of a unified institutional framework (Ho and So 1997). These points explain the better 
cooperation between Singapore and Johor than elsewhere. Politically, Johor has a strong political 
elite represented by the chief minister, who is very much at the forefront of promoting Johor’s 
industrial development. And throughout his long reign from 1895 to 1959, Sultan Ibrahim 
regarded himself as the political equality and social superior of the Governor of Singapore (Turnbull 
2012). The Johor government had a direct role in determining its development with more 
administrative efficiency (Ho and So 1997).  
As to the Riau Islands, on the other hand, was guided directly from Jakarta, so much so that 
one concern was that the regional government would be left out of the overall planning and 
development (Pangestu et al. 1991). As to the Riau Islands, for a long period its peripheral position 
in the political picture of Indonesia resulted in a low political hierarchy, government neglect, and 
considerable ineffectiveness. Therefore, there was a demand for better governance (Sparke et al. 
2004). Things have improved recently. According to Law No. 22 (1999), all regencies in the Riau 
Province were to receive autonomous status (http://prokum.esdm.go.id/uu/1999/uu-22-1999.pdf). 
Local government was freer to engage in economic affairs, and natural resources were enabled for 
local communities (Vidyattama 2010). Such a decentralized trend was further facilitated by the 
formation of Riau Island province in 2002 and the Decentralization Law of 2004.  
 
External Stimuli 
It may be essential to bring the region more “foreign factors,” which were historically lacking 
(Locher-Scholten 1994). For a long time, Japanese elements have played a key role in the 
development of regional economy, especially from the perspective of trade and economy. However, 
after the signing of Plaza Accord in 1985, Japan has fallen into the long-term economic recession. 
With its gradually deteriorated economic situation, its economic influence on the SIJORI area was 
also weakening. Nevertheless, the China’s MSRI seems to be a proper alternative to Japan for 
regional economy to rely on. 
 In 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping initiated the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road when 
he visited ASEAN. In the same year, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang emphasized the need to build the 
new MSRI oriented towards ASEAN, and to create strategic propellers for hinterland development. 
Such a Chinese initiative aims at the creation of a highly integrated, cooperative, and mutually 
beneficial set of maritime economic corridors linking European and Asian markets. The Straits of 
Malacca, with Singapore, Johor and the Riau Islands situated along, is a crucial corridor for the 
building of new MSRI. Therefore, the SIJORI-GT may gain another impulse after its long silence if 
the three regions could actively and adequately participate in this initiative. 
Rationales for the implementation of MSRI in triangle area are very similar to those for SIJORI 
cooperation, namely economic complementarities. From an economic perspective, there is a need 
for China to develop industrial capacity and demand outside. Rather than a traditional method of 
importing raw materials and producing in China, it tries to shift specific industries to outside of 
China and play a bigger role in the production chain by providing infrastructure and services to 
enable this and seeks to increase the purchasing power of locals in various countries and diversify 
China’s export markets. Therefore, China is eager to participate in the construction of ports and 
other related facilities in Southeast Asia and hopes that outward infrastructure investment will help 
boost production capacity in its iron, steel, aluminium and cement industries for export purposes 
(Zhao 2015). By contrast, ASEAN countries badly need more infrastructure investment and 
perceive that multilateral and private sector organizations are not acting fast enough to meet their 
needs. Building roads, laying railways, upgrading ports and boosting trade are those projects with 
highest priorities. 
There is no exception for the SIJORI-GT. Attributed to its strategic geographical location, 
China regards this area where the Straits of Malacca is located as highly sensitive and critical as 
Journal of Maritime Studies and National Integration, 3 (1), 1-13 
11 
Chinese shipping interest is vulnerable to disruption by unfriendly parties in times of conflict. Thus, 
securing a foothold in the Strait of Malacca will be a significant strategic achievement for China. 
Johor and the Riau Islands, situated along both sides of the strait, stand on a more advantageous 
position compared with other regions in the Malay Peninsula and Indonesia. It is hence natural 
them to become a key partner for the promotion of China’s MSRI in Southeast Asia. 
Several advantages and achieved success guarantees the promotion of MRSI in Johor and the 
Riau Islands. In Johor, Iskandar Malaysia is the earliest beneficiary of Chinese investments and 
attracts most of China’s investments in Malaysia. There have already been several trade missions 
between Chinese private and public sector groups, and Johor chambers of commerce and 
government parties to facilitate new trade cooperation activities in Iskandar Malaysia. Greenland’s 
joint venture with the Johor government to develop a 3,000-acre site in eastern Johor, including 
major industrial components, is one example. In addition, the RM7 billion Gemas-Johor Baru 
electrified double-tracking rail project was awarded to the state-owned China Railway Construction 
Corp. The track provides capacity for existing trains to move up to 160kph, improving the 
transport of goods across the country, including to Singapore. By late 2017, it is hoped to see the 
completion of the first Chinese development projects and also the start of construction for the HSR 
as well as the rapid transit system linking Singapore and Johor Baru. These will bring in the next 
wave of Chinese investors, which will primarily be in the manufacturing and services sectors. This is 
on top of the real estate and construction companies that we tend to focus on today. 
Apart from industrial and trade cooperation, port construction is another field for China’s 
MSRI initiative in Johor. The Johor Port, together with another five ports in Malaysia and 10 
Chinese ports, has formed a port alliance to fast-track trade by reducing customs bottlenecks at both 
ends, according to China’s top envoy to Malaysia, Huang Huikang. The port alliance will serve not 
only as a maritime network between the two countries but also the bond of trade and business and 
tourism. 
For the Riau Islands, it is the joint of China’s MSR and Indonesia’s global maritime fulcrum 
strategy, which aims to expand and deepen exchanges and cooperation in infrastructure, 
connectivity, tourism and people-to-people ties to further strengthen the China-Indonesia 
comprehensive strategic partnership. For this reason, the Riau Islands Province, especially its 
Municipality of Batam, is leading the way in exchanges and cooperation with China, and numerous 
Chinese enterprises are operating in this part of Indonesia. Batam is Indonesia’s first and most 
developed exclusive economic zone and has a great potential to attract more investment from 
Chinese enterprises in infrastructure, manufacturing, and tourism. For instance, on 2 September, 
2015, Chinese Sany Group invested in an attractive project. With the support of the Indonesian 
government, the "Sany Asia-Pacific Logistics Center" in Batam was established covering an area of 
225 acres. Sany hopes to provide better quality service for local customers in Batam; meanwhile, is 
expected to be a powerful machine & spare parts logistics warehouse distribution centre, which can 
expand its influence to Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and other neighbouring 
countries. Sany will strive to boost construction machinery development and urban construction for 
Southeast Asia. 
In addition, it also welcomes more Chinese tourists to Batam and Bintan and will continue to 
provide quality hard and soft environment for Chinese enterprises and tourists. From a Chinese 
perspective, China is likely to continue to support and encourage established Chinese enterprises to 
invest in the Riau Islands Province and the Municipality of Batam, encourage Chinese tourists to 
visit Riau Islands and move forward the multi-faceted exchanges and cooperation between the two 
sides. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The SIJORI-GT has undeniably promoted regional economic development and was regarded as a 
model of development for other regional cooperation initiatives. But at the same time, this article 
also shows that the progress of SIJORI-GT lacks sustainability. Reasons are various, but political. 
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Therefore, the best stimuli to encourage further cooperation and development relies on improved 
political coordination both regionally and internationally. At the regional level, the conventional 
top-down decision-making process needs a more equalized relationship between the three 
stakeholders to improve the efficiency of administration and operation regarding local affairs. At the 
international level, external factors aim at providing more resources and a more broad market from 
outside, especially under the background of global slow economic recovery. Therefore, this article 
argues that China’s MSRI has been so far the best external factor for this purpose. Based on the 
economic complementarities, China can cooperate as well as coordinate with the three stakeholders 
to conduct concrete industrial projects to help region economic development on the one hand, and 
to encourage the regional economic integration on the other. 
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